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Abstract
A deterministic server is shared by users with identical linear wait-
ing costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. Shortest jobs are served
ﬁrst for eﬃciency. The server can monitor the length of a job, but not
the identity of its user, thus merging, splitting or partially transfer-
ring jobs oﬀer cooperative strategic opportunities. Can we design cash
transfers to neutralize such manipulations?
We prove that merge-proofness and split-proofness are not com-
patible, and that it is similarly impossible to prevent all transfers of
jobs involving three agents or more. On the other hand, robustness
against pairwise transfers is feasible, and essentially characterize a
one-dimensional set of scheduling methods. This line is borne by two
outstanding methods, the merge-proof S+ and the split-proof S−.
Splitproofness, unlike Mergeproofness, is not compatible with sev-
eral simple tests of equity. Thus the two properties are far from equally
demanding.
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linear waiting cost.
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11 The problem and the punch lines
Dividing the burden of joint externalities raises many issues of incentive-
compatibility. One of these is strategic transferring, merging, or splitting of
certain private characteristics of the participants. This type of manipulation
is discussed in the fair division literature (see details in section 2); here we
study it in a simple scheduling problem with transferable utility.
A single deterministic server/machine is shared by users with linear wait-
ing costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. A job of size xi takes xi units
of time to process; an agent’s disutility is the waiting time until her job is
completed, augmented by a (positive or negative) cash payment selected by
the mechanism. The key assumptions is that the server can monitor the
size of a job, but not the identity of its user. This creates opportunities for
manipulation if two agents i,j can costlessly merge two jobs of sizes xi,x j
into a single job of size xi + xj, reporting to the server under one of their





i = xi, then request service under two aliases; or, ﬁnally, if agent
i can transfer a fraction of his job and add it to agent j’s job.
The key assumption is realistic when the usage of the server/machine
is private, and can’t be traced to its actual beneﬁciary. Think of a tool
that agents carry to their private workstation, for instance a software used
on a private machine. Protecting the privacy of the users is often a design
constraint, e.g., when they share a single "link" (access point to a database or
phone line). Then the needs of each user of the link remain unknown to the
server, who cannot detect if and when the link is used by agent i on behalf
of another agent j.T w o m o r e f a c t o r s a ﬀe c tt h ef e a s i b i l i t yo ft h es t r a t e g i c
maneuvers in question. First assuming a false identity should be easy, as is
the case in huge networks such as the internet, where protecting the system
performance against aliases is an important design issue: Douceur [2002].
The second factor is the cost of merging, splitting or transferring jobs: it is
minimal if the job produces an electronic document, or a physical tool easily
transported from one job to the next.
Two very simple scheduling mechanisms illustrate the cooperative ma-
nipulations that we wish to prevent. Given identical linear waiting costs
and the feasibility of cash transfers, eﬃciency requires to serve the shortest
jobs ﬁrst. Suppose the server does this and performs no monetary transfer
(at least when the eﬃcient scheduling order is unique, i.e., all jobs are of
diﬀerent size). This mechanism is highly vulnerable to splitting: given two
2real jobs x1 =4 ,x 2 =3 , agent 1 splits his job as x0
1 = x00
1 =2and cuts his
waiting time by 3. Partial transfers may also work: say we have three jobs
(x1,x 2,x 3)=( 1 ,4,5); if agent 3 transfers 2 units of her job to agent 1, re-
sulting in (x0
1,x 2,x 0
3)=( 3 ,4,3), she will complete x3 before agent 2 is served,
and the net gain $4 can be divided between agents 1 and 3 (we assume a cost
of $1 per unit of time). But the merging of jobs is clearly not proﬁtable, as
this can only delay their completion.
Consider next a mechanism serving the longest jobs ﬁrst, thus maximizing
total waiting cost. No matter how it deals with ties, this mechanism is badly
vulnerable to merging, as well as to partial transfers: simply use the above
examples backward. But the splitting of a job is never proﬁtable.
Can we design a system of cash transfers to prevent in all problems single
agents from splitting their job, and coalitions from merging them under a
single identity? And what about partial transfers of jobs?
Despite the simplicity of our scheduling model, some of the answers to
these questions are disappointingly negative. If the potential set of users
contains at least 4 agents, a mechanism treating equals equally cannot be
both merge-proof and split-proof: Theorem 1 in Section 4. Moreover every
continuous mechanism (i.e., net waiting costs depend continuously upon the
proﬁle of job sizes) is vulnerable to transfers involving three agents or more:
Section 8.
Yet we show here that the family of merge-proof scheduling mechanisms
is fairly large, and so is that of split-proof mechanisms. Moreover, each
family contains many mechanisms immune to job transfers involving only
two agents. Another result is that immunity to splitting is much more de-
manding than to merging. Speciﬁcally we show that Split-proofness, unlike
Merge-proofness, is incompatible with several compelling fairness require-
ments. Proposition 1 in Section 5 gives a precise content to this state-
ment. Restrict attention to eﬃcient mechanisms (serving successively jobs
of increasing size) treating equals equally, and continuous. Every splitproof
mechanism must then charge a positive fee to null jobs, who create no ex-
ternality whatsoever; it must also subsidize some jobs in the sense that their
net waiting cost is smaller than their size xi; next,the net cost of agent i is
not always weakly increasing in xi; the ordering of net costs must sometime
contradict that of job lengths; and ﬁnally the net waiting cost of a given
job is unbounded when other jobs become arbitrarily large. By contrast,
merge-proofness is compatible with all ﬁve properties just described.
In Section 6, we construct a large family of eﬃcient scheduling mech-
3anisms, treating equals equally and continuous, and for which the role of
merge-proofness and split-proofness is especially easy to describe. Pick a con-
tinuous function θ from R2
+ into R such that θ(a,b)+θ(b,a)=m i n {a,b} for all
a,b. Label the set of users N = {1,2,..,n} in such a way that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ .. ≤
xn. The θ-mechanism serves the job in the eﬃcient order 1,2,..,n, and per-
forms cash transfers resulting in the net waiting cost yi = xi +
P
j6=i θ(xi,x j)
for all i. By construction of θ, this implies
P
i yi = nx1+(n−1)x2+...+xn,
so these transfers are balanced.
We call the above mechanism separable b e c a u s ei td i v i d e st h ee ﬃcient
externality min{xi,x j} between agents i,j without paying attention to other
job lengths. Proposition 2 in Section 6 characterizes merge-proof separable
methods by a system of inequalities slightly less demanding than the super-
additivity of θ in its ﬁrst variable, and split-proof separable methods by a
similar system slightly more demanding than the sub-additivity of θ in its
ﬁrst variable.
Two separable mechanisms stand out. The ﬁrst one, called S+, splits the
(i,j)-externality equally, namely θ
+(a,b)=1
2 min{a,b}. The second mecha-
nism, called S−, uses the function θ
−(a,b)=b − 1
2 max{a,b}. The method
S+ corresponds to the Shapley value of the optimistic stand alone coopera-
tive game (a coalition S standing alone is served before N/S); the method
S− to the Shapley value of the pessimistic stand alone cooperative game (a
coalition S standing alone is served after N/S).
We ﬁnd that S+ is merge-proof, whereas S− is split proof - hence the
latter shares all unpalatable consequences of splitproofness discussed above.
In Section 7 we turn to the strategic transfer of jobs. We restrict atten-
tion to job transfers involving only two agents, combined with cash transfers
within a coalition of arbitrary size. We show that S+,S− as well as their
aﬃne combinations y = a · y+ +( 1− a) · y−,a ∈ R, a r ei m m u n et os u c h
manipulations. Our main result, Theorem 2, is a characterization of the line
of methods borne by S+ and S− based on this property of pairwise transfer-
proofness. T h e nw ec h a r a c t e r i z et h eS+ method either by the requirement
that null jobs should not pay (or receive) anything, or by ruling out subsidies
beyond the optimistic stand alone wait (xi ≤ yi).
42 Related literature
The earliest discussion in the fair division literature of manipulation by merg-
ing, splitting, and transferring, is in the rationing problem: each agent has
a claim/liability over an amount of money smaller than the sum of individ-
ual claims/liabilities. If the claims take the form of anonymous, transferable
bonds, dividing the money in proportion to individual claims is the only
method invulnerable to transfers, as well as to merging or splitting: Banker
[1981]. Variants and extensions of this result are in Moulin [1987], DeFru-
tos [1999], and Ju [2003]. Related properties of transfer-proofness appear in
the quasi-linear social choice problem (Moulin [1985], Ermolov [1995], Chun
[2000]), in axiomatic cost-sharing (Sprumont [2004]) and more: Ju and Miya-
gawa [2003] oﬀer a uniﬁed treatment of most of this literature.
We now review the recent and growing microeconomic literature on schedul-
ing. A familiar extension of our model allows linear waiting costs to vary
accross participants. A scheduling problem consists of a proﬁle of job sizes xi
and waiting costs δi per unit of time. Agent i0s disutility is δiwi + ti, where
wi is waiting time until completion of job i and ti is the cash payment. Min-




The mechanism designer can use the cash transfers to ensure truthful
(dominant strategy) elicitation of the privately known waiting costs: utili-
ties are linear in money (and waiting costs), therefore Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms can be readily applied. The ﬁrst authors to explore this idea are
Dolan [1978] and Mendelson and Whang [1990]. In fact, given linear waiting
costs, we can construct a budget-balanced (fully eﬃcient) VCG mechanism:
Suijs [1996], Mitra and Sen [1998], Mitra [2001,2002]. If we must elicit job
lengths instead of waiting costs, a similar construction is possible (Hain and
Mitra [2001], Kittsteiner and Moldovanu [2003a,b]), provided the VCG mech-
anisms are suitably generalized to take into account the more complicated
allocative externalities from misreporting the size of one’s job.
In the linear scheduling model cash transfers are also a simple tool to
achieve fairness, namely an equitable sharing of the congestion externality.
Several auhors simply apply oﬀ-the-shelve solution concepts like the Shapley
value or the core to a relevant cooperative game: Curiel et al. [1989], [1993],
[2002], Hamers et al. [1996]. The most popular solution is the Shapley value
of the optimistic stand alone cooperative game: Curiel et al. [1993] and
Klijn and Sanchez [2002]. It plays an important role in the current paper as
5solution S+. In the case of identical job sizes, this solution is axiomatized
by Maniquet [2003], while Katta and Sethuraman [2004] suggest alternative
interpretations of fairness. The Shapley value of the pessimistic stand alone
game corresponds to our second solution S−. With identical job sizes it is
axiomatized by Chun [2004a]. Chun [2004b] allows for variable job sizes,
extends both solutions to this context and oﬀers parallel characterizations.
Our approach is original on two accounts. First we explore a new kind of
cooperative manipulation, quite diﬀerent from the misreport of waiting costs
or of job sizes. In our model, individual preferences are known to the server,
and job size is observable. All the action comes from the inability of the
server to detect the true identity of users, and the users’ ability to request a
job, or part of a job, without revealing its true beneﬁciary.
Secondly we explore the compatibility of our strategy-proofness proper-
ties with four classic equity tests, based on monotonicity and bounds on
individual disutilities (see Section 5). These tests are inspired by the fair
division literature, and play a role as well in the work of Maniquet [2003]
and Chun [2004]. Here they reveal a fundamental asymmetry between the
requirements of merge-proofness and split-proofness (Proposition 1).
The companion paper Moulin [2004] discusses the same strategic ma-
neuvers when the server instead of cash transfers, uses randomization. In
that context, Split-proofness remains a much more demanding property than
Merge-proofness, yet these two properties are now compatible. A certain
probabilistic scheduling rule, the Proportional rule, is characterized by the
combination of Merge-proofness, Split-proofness and a couple of natural
properties of invariance and fairness.
3 The model
The set N contains all potential users of the simple machine. It may be ﬁnite
or inﬁnite. A scheduling problem involves a ﬁnite subset N of N.A g e n ti’s
job is completed in exactly xi units of machine-time. Given a scheduling
problem (N,x), where x ∈ RN
+, the server must choose the ordering σ of N
- the schedule - in which the jobs will be processed, and a vector t ∈ RN of
monetary transfers such that
P
N ti =0 .
Each agent incurs a waiting cost of $1 per unit of time until completion
of his/her job (a partially completed job is useless). The equality of waiting
6costs is an important simplifying assumption1.
We write σ(i) <σ (j) to mean that agent i precedes agent j in the ordering
σ,a n dP(i,σ)={j ∈ N/σ(j) <σ (i)} is the set of agents preceding i in σ.
Thus the disutility of agent i given σ and t is
yi = xi +
X
P(i,σ)
xj + ti (1)
Notice that ti is a tax on agent i when ti > 0 and a subsidy when ti < 0.
The standard notation aS =
P
i∈S ai will be used throughout the paper.
Because monetary transfers are unrestricted, eﬃciency amounts to choose an










An ordering is eﬃcient if and only if it schedules shortest jobs ﬁrst. The set
of eﬃcient orderings is
E(N,x)={σ|for all i,j ∈ N : xi <x j =⇒ σ(i) <σ (j)}
We use the notations a∧b =m i n {a,b},a n dN(2) for the set of all non-ordered






Deﬁnition 1 Given N, a scheduling mechanism µ associates to every
problem (N,x), where N ⊂ N and x ∈ RN
+, ap a i rµ(N,x)=( σ,t), where
σ is an ordering of N, and t ∈ RN with tN =0 . As c h e d u l i n gmethod m
associates to every problem (N,x) ap r o ﬁle of net waiting costs m(N,x)=
y,y ∈ RN, such that
yN = xN +
X
(i,j):σ(i)<σ(j)
xi, for some ordering σ of N.
To each mechanism µ, we associate a method m by formula (1). We call
the mechanism µ eﬃcient if σ ∈ E(N,x) for all N,x; we call the method m
eﬃcient if yN = v(N,x) for all N,x. To an eﬃcient method m corresponds
1The consequences of relaxing this assumption are brieﬂy discussed in Section 9.
7essentially a unique eﬃcient mechanism µ : the only qualiﬁcation is at those
problems x where some jobs have the same size, xi = xj, so that E(N,x)
is not a singleton. As this will cause no confusion, we shall state some of
our axioms for mechanisms (e.g. Merge-proofness) and some of them for
methods.
Our ﬁrst normative requirement is the standard horizontal equity:
Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE): xi = xj =⇒ yi = yj,f o ra l l
(N,x),i,j∈ N
All methods discussed below meet ETE, yet this property is not necessary
to our main characterization result (Theorem 2). By contrast, the following
axiom plays a key role in Theorem 2
Continuity (CONT): the mapping x → y(N,x) is continuous on RN
+ for
all N.
Continuity ensures that microscopic variations in the job sizes do not have
a macroscopic impact on the proﬁle of net waiting costs. In particular when
xi = xj, as m a l lt r e m b l eo fxi - the result of a measurement error, or of a
strategic move - is not a matter of concern to agents i,j, or to anyone else.
Our ﬁrst example is a natural discontinuous mechanism.
Example 1 Shortest Jobs First
For every (N,x) where xi 6= xj for all i,j, the mechanism selects the unique
eﬃcient ordering σ and performs no transfers. At other proﬁles, it performs
the minimal transfers required by ETE. If at x we have exactly k agents with












In other words, the mechanism is deﬁned up to a tie-breaking rule, but the
corresponding method is unique:







Our next two examples are eﬃcient scheduling methods meeting ETE




· v(N,x) for all x 6=0 ;y =0for x =0 ,( 2 )
8and the egalitarian method:






xi ∧ xj) for all N,x.( 3 )
The latter charges the same net cost to every agent beyond his/her own stand
alone cost. The proportional method meets all (and the egaliatrian method
meets some) equity tests discussed in Section 5, yet both are vulnerable to
the coalitional maneuvers to which we now turn.
4 Merging and Splitting
The server can recognize the length of the jobs it performs, but not the
identity of the beneﬁciary of those jobs. We describe ﬁrst the merging of
several jobs under a single identity, then turn to splitting a given job in
several small jobs under multiple identities.
Given N ⊆ N, a coalition S, S ⊆ N, and an agent i∗ ∈ S,w ea s s o c i a t e
to every problem (N,x) the (S,i∗)−merged problem (N∗,x ∗) as follows
N∗ =( N\S) ∪ {i∗};x∗
i∗ = xS and x∗
j = xj for all j ∈ N\S
We also use the notation v(S,x)=xS +
P
S(2) xi ∧ xj for the stand alone
waiting cost of coalition S,n a m e l yt h ee ﬃcient total wait of S when it is
served before N\S. Given a mechanism µ on N we deﬁne:






∗) ⇒ yS(N,x) ≤ v(S,x)+k(S,x) · xP(i∗,σ∗) + t
∗
i∗ (4)
where k(S,x) is the number of agents i ∈ S such that xi > 0.
In this inequality the left-hand side is the net waiting cost of coalition S
before merging, and the right-hand side its net cost after merging. Indeed
coalition S uses eﬃciently the slot of length xS allocated to agent i∗, and
moreover everyone in S with a non null job must wait until completion of all
jobs in P(i∗,σ ∗). Note that for S = N, the merge-proofness inequality is just
the eﬃciency property.
Given N ⊆ N,i ∗ ∈ N, and a ﬁnite set T ⊆ N,T∩ N = ∅, we associate
to every problem (N,x), the family of (T,i∗)−splitted problems (N∗,x ∗) as
follows
9N∗ = N ∪ T;(x∗)T∪i∗ = xi∗ and (x∗)j = xj for all j ∈ NÂi∗
Given a mechanism µ on N we deﬁne:
Split-proofness (SPF): for all N,T,i∗ as above, all x ∈ RN
+ and all
(T,i∗)-splitted problem (N∗,x ∗)
µ(N∗,x ∗)=( σ∗,t ∗) ⇒ yi∗(N,x) ≤ xi∗ + xP(j∗,σ∗) +( t∗)T∪i∗ (5)
where j∗ is the last agent in T ∪ i∗ for σ∗.
Agent i∗’ sn e tc o s tb e f o r es p l i t t i n gi so nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d e ;a f t e rt h es p l i t ,i∗
must wait until all jobs in P(j∗,σ∗) are completed2, therefore the right-hand
side is his net cost.
As a ﬁrst application of these deﬁnitions, it is easy to verify that Shortest
Job First is not split-proof, but it is merge-proof. Symmetrically, Longest
Job First is split-proof, but not merge-proof.
We check now that the egalitarian method (3) is neither merge-proof nor
split-proof. In the problem N = {1,2,3},x =( 1 ,1,4), consider the split
of x3 into x∗3 and x∗4, with x∗3 = x∗4 =2 . The actual wait of agent 3 in
(N,x) i st h es a m ea si nN∗ = {1,2,3,4},x ∗ =( 1 ,1,2,2)− under the assumed





( 1+1+1 )⇒ t3 = −1
(y∗)34 =4+6+( t∗)34 =2 ( 2+
1
4
(7)) ⇒ (t∗)34 = −2.5
Next consider the problem N = {1∗,2,3,4},x=( 2 ,2,5,5). The actual total
wait of agents 1,2 in (N,x) is unchanged as they merge to 1∗ in N∗ =
{1∗,3,4},x ∗ =( 4 ,5,5).T h e m o v e i s p r o ﬁtable because the net transfer
decreases:
y1∗2 =6+t12 =2 ( 2+
1
4











We let the reader check similarly that the proportional method (2) is not split-
proof, by considering the split of agent 1 from ({1,2},(5,4)) into ({1,2,3},(5,2,2)).
2At least if (x∗)j∗ > 0. If (x∗)j∗ =0 , we should replace j∗ by the last agent in T ∪ i∗
with a positive job. But this does not aﬀect the statement of SPF.
10On the other hand, the proportional method is merge-proof. We omit the
easy proof.
Theorem 1 Assume |N| ≥ 4. There is no scheduling mechanism satisfy-
ing Merge-proofness, Split-proofness, and either Continuity or Equal Treat-
ment of Equals.
The proof is in the Appendix. Recall that merge-proofness implies in particu-
lar eﬃciency. If we restrict the merge-proofness property by allowing only the
merging of proper coalitions, there may exist some (ineﬃcient) mechanisms
meeting MPF and SPF. I conjecture that this is not the case.
5 Unpalatable consequences of Split-proofness
The formal similarity between merging and splitting suggests that the prop-
erties MPF and SPF are comparably demanding. This intuition is not cor-
rect. We list below ﬁve mild normative requirements that we may want to
impose on a scheduling method. Then we show that any "reasonable" split-
proof method must violate each one of these four properties. In the following
statements, we ﬁx a method (N,x) → y :




• Ranking (RKG): {xi ≤ xj} ⇒ {yi ≤ yj} for all N,i,j,x
• Stand Alone Bound (SAB): yi ≥ xi for all N,i, x
• Zero Charge for Null Jobs (ZCNJ): xi =0⇒ yi =0for all N,i, x
• Finite Liability (FL): supx−i∈R
N\i
+ yi(N,(xi,x −i)) < +∞ for all N,i,xi
The ﬁrst three properties are standard equity tests. The Stand Alone Bound
sets a minimal net waiting cost, namely my disutility in the most optimistic
case where I have absolute priority for service. It rules out the subsidization
of any agent beyond this most advantageous situation. Monotonicity says
that my net waiting cost weakly increases when the service time of my job
increases: besides its clear normative meaning, this property also rules out
"sabotage" by artiﬁcially increasing one’s job size. Ranking conveys a related
idea by way of interpersonal comparisons: if my job is larger than yours, my
responsibility in the total waiting burden is higher.
11Zero Charge for Null Jobs frees a "null job" agent of any responsibility:
such an agent is served ﬁrst by eﬃciency, and causes no additional waiting
cost to any one: the axiom says that he should not be taxed either, ti =0 .
The combination of Continuity and Zero Charge for Null Jobs implies that
yi converges to zero with xi.
Finally, Finite Liability prevents a job of a given size to pay arbitrary
large fees when other jobs become very large. It encourages participation of
a risk averse user who has no information about other jobs’ sizes.
Many scheduling methods meet these ﬁve properties. Examples include
Shortest Job First (example 1) and the proportional method (2): check that
supx−i yi(N,(xi,x −i)) = n · xi for the former, and =
(n+1)
2 · xi for the latter.
Moreover, all ﬁve properties are preserved under convex combinations. The
egalitarian method (3) fails ZCNJ and FL, but meets the other three.
We now state a negative result about split-proof scheduling methods.
Proposition 1 Fix N and an eﬃcient and continous scheduling method
m treating equals equally. If m is split-proof and N ≥ 5 then it must fails
Monotonicity, Ranking and the Stand Alone bound. If |N| ≥∞ , it fails Zero
Charge for Null Jobs and Finite Liability as well.
By contrast the S+ solution deﬁned in the next Section, is an eﬃcient
merge-proof method meeting all the other axioms discussed so far: ETE,
C O N T ,M O N ,R K G ,S A B ,Z C N Ja n dF L .
Proof
Monotonicity.L e t N = {1,2,3,4} and x(ε)=( 1 ,1,1,2(1 + ε)). Consider
the split of agent 4 into agents 4,5 and x∗(ε)=( 1 ,1,1,1+ε,1+ε). By CONT
and ETE:
lim
ε→0y(x∗(ε)) = y(x∗(0)) = (3,3,3,3,3)
By eﬃciency and CONT again:
{y45(x∗(ε)) = 4 + ε +5+ε + t45(x∗(ε)) → 6} ⇒ lim
ε→0t45(x∗(ε)) = −3
Because the split is not proﬁt a b l ef o ra g e n t4 ,a n dh e rr e a lw a i ta f t e rt h e
split is unchanged, we have
y4(x(ε)) ≤ 5+2 ε + t45(x∗(ε)) ⇒ y4(x(0)) ≤ 2
On the other hand at x =( 1 ,1,1,1) ETE gives y4(x)=2 .5, and we see that
Monotonicity is violated as x4 goes from 1 to 2.
12Ranking.L e tN = {1,2,3} and x(ε)=( 1 ,1,2(1 + ε)). Consider the split of
agent 3 into 3,4 and x∗(ε)=( 1 ,1,1+ε,1+ε). Mimicking the argument of
the proof above we get successively
lim
ε→0y(x∗(ε)) = (2.5,2.5,2.5,2.5),lim
ε→0t34(x∗(ε)) = −2, and y3(x(0)) ≤ 2
Now eﬃciency and ETE give y1(x(0)) = y2(x(0)) ≥ 2.5, a contradiction of
RKG.
Stand Alone bound.L e t N = {1,2}and x(ε)=( 1 ,3(1 + ε)). Consider the





⇒ y2(x(0)) ≤ 2.5 < 3=x2(0)
This contradicts SAB.
Zero Charge for Null Jobs.L e t N = {1,2} and ﬁx an integer p,p ≥ 2.
Set x(ε)=( 1




p+ε). As before we have limε→0 yi(x∗(ε)) =
p+2
2p implying
limε→0 t1(x∗(ε)) = 1
2. Then Split-proofness implies y2(x(ε)) ≤ 1+pε + 1
p −
t1(x∗(ε)) hence y2(x(0)) ≤ 1
2 + 1
p ⇐⇒ y1(x(0)) ≥ 1
2 + 1
p. But CONT and
ZCNJ imply limp→∞ y1((1
p,1)) = 0, contradiction.
Finite Liability. Set N = {1,2} and x(ε)=( a,k · (a + ε)),w h e r ea>0 is
arbitrary. Consider the split of 2 to 2,3,..,k+1in x∗(ε)=( a,a+ε,..,a+ε).
We have limε→0 t{2,..,k+1}(x∗(ε)) = −k
2 · a, and Split-proofness implies




from which supk y1(a,k·a) follows. This proves the claim when |N| =2 .T h e
argument is similar for an arbitrary number of agents.
Remark 1 For the statements about Ranking and the Stand Alone
bound, the assumption Equal Treatment of Equals is redundant. In other
words, any eﬃcient, continous and split-proof method must violate Rank-
ing and the Stand Alone bound for |N| ≥ 4. To check this, take a set
N∗ with four agents. Setting x∗(0) = (1,1,1,1), we have yN∗(x∗(0)) = 10
thus there exists a pair i,j in N∗ such that yij((1,1,1,1)) ≤ 5. Label the
13agents so that i =3 ,j =4and N∗ = {1,2,3,4}. Deﬁne N = {1,2,3},x(ε)
and x∗(ε), as in the above argument about Ranking. Continuity ensures
limε→0 y34(x∗(ε)) ≤ 5, then limε→0 t34(x∗(ε)) ≤− 2. Split-proofness applied
to the split of 3 in (N,x(ε)) to 3,4 in (N∗,x ∗(ε)) gives y3(x(0)) ≤ 2. Therefore
y12(x(0)) ≥ 5 so that yi(x(0)) ≥ 2.5 f o ra tl e a s to n eo f1 , 2 . T h u sR a n k i n g
fails. The similar proof for the Stand Alone Bound is omitted for brevity.
Whether or not we can drop Equal Treatment from the assumptions in
the two remaining statements is an open question.
6 Separable scheduling methods
The total waiting externality in the problem (N,x) is v(N,x)=xN + P
N(2) xi ∧ xj, n a m e l yt h ec o s to fh a v i n gt os h a r et h es e r v e r . Aseparable
method shares each pairwise externality xi ∧ xj independently of the rest of
the jobs.
Deﬁnition 1 Choose a continuous function θ from R2
+ into R such that





θ(xi,x j) for all N,i ∈ N and x ∈ R
N
+
The θ-separable method is obviously eﬃcient, continous, and treats equals
equally.





if a = b;θ(a,b)=a if a>b
Neither the egalitarian nor the proportional method is separable.
We speak of a θ−separable mechanism for any mechanism generating the
method in Deﬁnition 1.
Proposition 2
a) The θ-separable scheduling method meets
i) Monotonicity iﬀ {θ(a,b) is non-decreasing in a}.
ii) Ranking iﬀ {θ(a,b) is non-decreasing in a and a ≤ b ⇒ θ(a,b) ≤ b
2}.
iii) Stand Alone Bound iﬀ {θ(a,b) ≥ 0 for all a,b}.
iv) Zero Charge for Null Job iﬀ {θ(0,b)=0for all b}.
14v) Finite Liability iﬀ supb θ(a,b) < +∞ for all a.
b) A θ-separable mechanism is merge-proof iﬀ
θ(a1,b)+θ(a2,b) ≤ θ(a1 + a2,b) for all b,a1,a 2 : a1 + a2 ≤ b (6)
θ(a1,b)+θ(a2,b) ≤ θ(a1 + a2,b)+b for all b,a1,a 2
c) A θ-separable mechanism is split-proof iﬀ
θ(a1 + a2,b)+b ≤ θ(a1,b)+θ(a2,b) for all b,a1,a 2 : b ≤ a1,a 2 (7)
θ(a1 + a2,b) ≤ θ(a1,b)+θ(a2,b) for all b,a1,a 2
Proof
Statement i. Suppose θ(a,b) >θ (a0,b) for some a<a 0. Fix n and consider
the (n +1 ) −agents proﬁles x =( a,b,...b) and x0 =( a0,b,..,b). For n large
enough, we have
y1(x)=a + n · θ(a,b) >a
0 + n · θ(a
0,b)=y1(x
0)
contradicting MON. The converse statement is obvious.
Statement ii. Suppose θ(a,b) >θ (a0,b) for some a<a 0. Consider the
(n +2 ) −agents proﬁle x =( a,a0,b,...b). For n large enough we get y1 >y 2,
contradicting Ranking. Thus θ must be monotonic in its ﬁrst variable. Next
we ﬁx a,b,a ≤ b, and apply Ranking to x =( a,b):
y1(x)=a + θ(a,b) ≤ y2(x)=b + θ(b,a)=b + a − θ(a,b)
establishing the second property in statement ii. The converse property is
just as easy.
Merge-proofness.F i xN,S,i∗,xa si nt h ep r e m i s e so f( 4 )a n dd e v e l o pt h i s






































Therefore inequality (4) amounts to







Check that if θ satisﬁes (6), then (8) holds for all N,S,i∗ and x.T h e t o p
inequality in (6) implies θ(0,b) ≤ 0. Repeated applications of the bottom one
give X
S
θ(xi,b) ≤ θ(xS,b)+( k(S,x) − 1) · b, and
X
S
θ(xi,b) ≤ θ(xS,b) if xS ≤ b
Applying the top inequality to b = xj for all j ∈ P(i∗,σ ∗), and the bottom
one to xj for all j ∈ N\(S ∪ P(i∗,σ∗)) gives the desired inequality (8).
Next we prove that (6) must hold if θ meets (8) for all problems and all
merging. Consider N = {1,2,3},S = {1,2},i ∗ =1and x =( a1,a 2,b) for
arbitrary ai,b in R+. If a1 + a2 <b , P (i∗,σ∗) is empty and (8) yields the
top inequality in (6). Continuity of θ t a k e sc a r eo ft h ec a s ea1 + a2 = b. If
a1 + a2 >b ,P(i∗,σ ∗)={3} and (8) gives the bottom inequality in (6).
Split-proofness. We develop similarly inequality (5) for the θ-separable
method. First we compute (t∗)T∪i∗ in (5). Set T ∪ i∗ = R and |R| = r,
then relabel agents in R as 1,2,..,r with (x∗)1 ≥ (x∗)2 ≥ ... ≥ (x∗)r. Thus
xi∗ =
Pr
1(x∗)k. In the split problem (N∗,x ∗), the total wait of coalition R (if
this coalition was truly made of r diﬀerent agents) is v(R,x∗)+
Pr
k=1 k ·xSk
where Sk contains those agents in N\i∗ ranked before k and after k +1in
σ∗. In particular for j ∈ Sk,(x∗)k ≥ xj ≥ (x∗)k+1. We can now compute the
































We show ﬁnally that (7) is true if and only if (9) holds for all N,i∗,T and
x. The "if" statement follows easily from applying (9) to N = {1,2},i ∗ =
2,T = {3},x=( b,a1+a2) and x∗ =( b,a1,a 2). If b ≤ a1,a 2 we have S2 = {1}
and we get the top inequality in (7). For other values of b, S2 is empty and
we get the rest of (7).
Before proving the "only if" statement, we notice a consequence of (7).
Fix k, ak,k=1 ,..,r such that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ .... ≥ ar, and b.W eh a v e




We omit the easy proof. Apply this inequality to ak =( x∗)k and to b = xj
for some agent j in Sk,w eg e t




Summing up over all j ∈ N\i∗ gives (9) as desired.
Proposition 2 shows that among separable scheduling methods, it is easy
to ensure merge-proofness or split-proofness. The former requires θ to be
something less than superadditive in its ﬁrst variable; the latter requires θ
to be something more than subadditive in its ﬁrst variable. The two re-
quirements are incompatible: this results from Theorem 1, or can be checked
directly by comparing systems (6) and (7).
Two separable methods stand out for the simplicity of their deﬁnition
and their multiple interpretations. Moreover, they are the backbone of the
characterization of transfer-proof methods in the next section.












(a ∨ b) for all a,b
The corresponding net waiting costs and transfers for a problem (N,x) with














((n − i)xi − x{1,i−1})
y
−











(x{i+1,n} − (i − 1)xi)
w h e r ew eu s et h en o t a t i o nx{i,j} =
P
i≤k≤j xk.
These formulas follow easily from Deﬁnition 1.
The S+ method divides equally the externality xi∧xj between xi and xj.
If xi <x j, agent i is served ﬁrst and gives a "rebate" 1
2xi to agent j.W i t h
the S− method, agent i gives a larger rebate 1
2xj.






a fairly reasonable compromise. But for larger sizes of N,t h em e t h o dS−
has several unappealing features.
Proposition 3
i) The scheduling method S+ is merge-proof. It also satisﬁes Monotonicity,
Ranking, Stand Alone Bound, Zero Charge for Null Jobs and Finite Liability.
ii) The scheduling method S− is split-proof. Hence it violates these ﬁve prop-
erties.
Proof
That S+ meets the ﬁve properties MON, RKG, SAB, ZCNJ and FL is obvi-
ous, either by direct inspection of the formula for y
+
i ,o rb yi n v o k i n gP r o p o -
sition 2. Note that the liability of job i among the users N with |N| = n
is supx−i yi((xi,x −i)) = n+1
2 · xi. This is the smallest feasible liability in our
model.
Proposition 1 and Split-proofness imply that S− violates all ﬁve prop-
erties; this fact can also be checked directly on the formula for y
−
i ,o rb y
invoking Proposition 2. In particular S− has the following "anti-ranking"
property: xi <x j =⇒ yi >y j.
Next one checks easily that the function θ
+ has the subadditivity proper-
ties (6), whereas θ
− has the superadditivity properties (7), and the proof is
complete.
18We conclude this section with several alternative interpretations of S+
and S−.
Lemma 1 The proﬁle of net costs selected by the method S+ is the Shap-
ley value of the optimistic Stand Alone cooperative game S → v(S,x) for all
S ⊆ N. The proﬁle selected by the method S− is the Shapley value of the
pessimistic stand alone game S → w(S,x)=|S|·xN\S + v(S,x).
In the optimistic (resp. pessimistic) Stand Alone game, the total cost of
ac o a l i t i o nS is its eﬃcient cost when it is served before (resp. after) the
complement coalition NÂS.
Proof. The interpretation of S+ as the Shapley value of the optimistic
game is already in Curiel et al [2002]. For the sake of completeness, we give
a proof here. Given N,S ⊆ N and i ∈ N\S, the marginal contribution of
agent i to S is




Therefore the (i,j)−externality xi ∧ xj is charged to agent i if and only if j
appears before i in the random ordering of N: this happens with probability
.5, so the Shapley value awards precisely y
+
i to agent i.
Next we check that y− is the Shapley value of the game w. By additivity
of the value this amounts to check that y− − y+ is the value of the game











xi and α(S ∪ i,x) − α(S,x)=xN\S\i − |S|·xi
f r o mw h i c ht h ed e s i r e dc o n c l u s i o nf o l l o w se a s i l y .
Remark 2 Yet another interpretation of S+ is by means of the serial
cost sharing formula of Friedman and Moulin [1999]. Consider the scheduling
problem (N,x) as a cost sharing problem with the demand proﬁle x and the
cost function C(x)=v(N,x). One checks easily that y+ is the proﬁle of cost
shares under the serial cost sharing formula deﬁned there. Finally, we note
that under S+, the transfer t
+
i to agent i does not depend upon the length of
jobs longer than xi; whereas under S−,t
−
i is independent of the length of jobs
shorter than xi. In combination with eﬃciency and equal treatment of equals,
these properties are clearly characteristic. In the related scheduling model
where all jobs are of equal length but agents diﬀer by their linear waiting
cost, Maniquet [2003] and Chun [2004] use similar independence properties
to characterize respectively the analog of our S+ and S− scheduling methods.
197 Transfer of jobs and the main result
We consider a manipulation related to merging and splitting, yet more subtle
because it involves a partial transfer of jobs. The number of agents remains
constant during the transfer, therefore in this section we may assume N = N.
Our main result (Theorem 2 below) characterizes the scheduling mech-
anisms robust against partial transfers of jobs involving only two agents,
together with monetary transfers among possibly more agents. This restric-
tion is crucial. In Section 8 we derive an impossibility result when transfers
among three agents or more are feasible.
Given N,i,j ∈ N,ε > 0, and two proﬁles x,x0 such that xk = x0
k for


















Finally the notation ∆(σ;i,j) stands for the set of agents in N that ordering
σ ranks between i and j. We are now ready to deﬁne the two sides of the
transfer-proofness axiom. Throughout these deﬁnitions we ﬁx the set N of
agents, |N| ≥ 3.
Pairwise Shrink-proofness: for all S,S ⊂ N, x,a n dε−shrink x0 of x by
i,j ∈ S
yS(N,x) ≤ yS(N,x
0) − ε (10)




0) ⇒ yS(N,x) ≤ yS(N,x
0)+ε + x∆(σ0;i,j) (11)
Note that we do not allow pairwise transfers exchanging the ordering of jobs
1 and 2, as when x1,x 2 with x1 <x 2 becomes x0
1,x 0





2 = x1 + x2 . T h i sr e s t r i c t i o ni sw i t h o u ta n yl o s so fg e n e r a l i t y ,
because the deviating agents have every incentive to use eﬃciently the time
slots allocated to their reported jobs. In the conﬁguration above, the slot for
x0
2 will be used to complete job x1 and start job x2. Therefore the shift from
x to x0 is equivalent to a shrink from (x1,x 2) to (x0
2,x 0
1).
Deﬁnition 3 We call the mechanism µ pairwise transfer-proof (PTP)
if it is pairwise shrink-proof and spread-proof.
S e v e r a lc o m m e n t so nt h i sd e ﬁnition are in order. Firstly, the PTP concept
applies to scheduling mechanisms because, as explained below, the choice of
20σ0 = µ(N,x0) matters to the spread-proofness property (but not to that of
pairwise shrink-proofness).
The second observation is that PTP rules out certain maneuvers by coali-
tions S of arbitrary size: although the partial transfer of jobs only concerns
two agents, other agents in S are involved in cash transfers inside S.
Next we comment on the inequality deﬁning shrink-proofness. The left-
hand side is the total net cost of coalition S before the (job and cash)
transfers. We claim that the right-hand side is its total net cost after
the job transfer. Without loss of generality, suppose i =1 ,j =2and
x0
1 = x1 + ε ≤ x2 − ε = x0
2. The real job x1 will be completed whenever
x0
1 is served, and job x2 when x0
2 is served. If a reported job x0
1 or x0
2 is served
after some agent j,j 6=1 ,2, so does the corresponding real job, and vice-
versa. Thus the diﬀerence between the waiting time of the real jobs x1,x 2,




For instance, we check that the proportional mechanism is not pairwise
shrink-proof. Let N = {1,2,3},x=( 1 ,6,5) and S = {1,2} with x0
1 =3 ,x 0
2 =







· (22) − 2=y12(x
0) − ε
Recall that this method is in fact merge-proof. We let the reader check that
the egalitarian method also fails (10) for the following three-person example:
x =( 1 ,8,2),x







Finally we explain inequality (11). Suppose i =1 ,j=2 ,x 0
1 = x1−ε,x0
2 =
x2 +ε,x1 ≤ x2. After the report, the real job x1 w i l ln o tb ec o m p l e t e dw h e n
job x0
1 is done, but only during the service of job x0
2. Thus the diﬀerence
between the wait of the real jobs and that of the reported jobs is





If the set ∆(σ0;1,2) is not empty, a spread from x to x0 introduces the
additional waiting time x∆(σ0;1,2) to the reported waiting time of S at x0. Thus
pairwise spread-proofness ends up being easier to meet than pairwise shrink-
proofness. For instance, all three methods Shortest Job First, proportional
and egalitarian are spread-proof.





if a ≤ b;=
b2
a + b
if b ≤ a
Set N = {1,2,3} and x =( 1 ,2,3). Consider the ε−spread by {1,2} to
x0 =( 1− ε,2+ε,3) with 0 <ε<1. Inequality (11) for S = {1,2} reads
y12(x)=4+θ(1,3) + θ(2,3) ≤ 4+θ(1 − ε,3) + θ(2 + ε,3) = y12(x0)+ε
It is violated because θ(a,b) is strictly concave in a on [0,b].
We are ready to state our main characterization result.
Theorem 2 Fix N with |N| ≥ 4.
i) Choose two continuous functions, α : R+ → R and γ : R+ → RN such
that
P
N γi(z)=0for all z. Deﬁne a scheduling method y as follows:
y(x)=α(xN) · y
+(x)+( 1− α(xN)) · y
−(x)+γ(xN) for all x ∈ R
N
+
where y+,y− are the methods S+ and S− as in Deﬁnition 2. Any corre-
sponding mechanism is eﬃcient, continuous, and pairwise transfer-proof.
ii) Conversely, if a mechanism µ is eﬃcient, continuous and pairwise trans-
ferproof, the associated method y takes the above form.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The PTP axiom, almost single handedly, captures a fairly small family of
scheduling methods/mechanisms. This family contains the aﬃne combina-
tions of S+,S− t ow h i c hw ec a na d ds o m e" c o n s t a n t "γ,w h e r et h ec o e ﬃcients
of the aﬃne combination and the constant depend only upon xN.
The mild property of Scale Invariance allows us to pick a one-dimensional
family of methods:
Scale Invariance (SI): y(λx)=λy(x) for all λ>0,x∈ RN
+
Corollary 1 to Theorem 2 Consider a mechanism µ deﬁned as in
statement i) by the functions α and γ :
i) µ treats equals equally iﬀ γ(z)=0for all z.
ii) µ is scale invariant iﬀ α is constant and γ is homogeneous of degree 1.
If we combine Continuity, Equal Treatment, Scale Invariance, with eﬃ-
ciency and Pairwise Transfer-proofness, Corollary 1 tells us that we are left
with the one-dimensional line of methods joining S+ and S−. These methods




(a ∧ b) −
(1 − α)
2
(a − b) for all a,b ≥ 0
22The parameter α is any real number. The method S+ obtains for α =1and
S− for α =0 .
Corollary 2 to Theorem 2 Consider a mechanism µ deﬁned as in
statement i) by the functions α and γ :
i) µ is merge-proof if and only if α(z) ≥ 1 for all z.
ii) µ is split-proof if and only if α(z) ≤ 0 for all z.
This establishes the polar role of S+ and S− within the family described
in Theorem 2, or in Corollary 1.
If Theorem 2 and its Corollaries 1 and 2 give a symmetrical role to S+
and S−, this symmetry is destroyed as soon as we introduce the normative
requirements of Section 5. Not surprisingly, these properties point toward
the method S+.
Corollary 3 to Theorem 2 The mechanism S+ is characterized by
the combination of eﬃciency, Continuity, Pairwise Transfer-proofness and
either Zero Charge for Null Jobs, or the Stand Alone bound.
Remark 3 Two additional properties can be used to single out the S+
method. They both place an upper bound on individual net waiting costs,
which is the familiar idea of a lower bound on individual welfare. The pes-
simistic stand alone bound for agent i is simply yi ≤ w({i},x)=xN. Both
S+ and S− meet this bound. The unanimity bound for agent i is yi ≤ n+1
2 xi.
It is this agent’s net cost in a hypothetical problem (N,e x) where all jobs are
of size xi. As indicated in the proof of proposition 3, S+ m e e t st h i sb o u n d ,
whereas S− violates it, even for |N| =2 .
Now S+ is characterized by the combination of eﬃciency, Continuity,
Pairwise Transfer-proofness and either {the pessimistic stand alone bound
plus the unanimity bound}, or {the pessimistic stand alone bound and merge-
proofness}. The proof is in the Appendix.
8 Transfers among three or more agents
The two benchmark methods S+ and S−,a n dt h e i ra ﬃne combinations, are
not vulnerable to bilateral partial transfers of jobs, but trilateral transfers
can be a problem.
A simple example with N = {1,2,3,4} illustrates this important point.
In the problem x =( 1 ,1,8,3) coalition T = {1,2,3} rearranges its three jobs
as x0 =( 2 ,4,4,3). T h ea c t u a lw a i to fe v e r y o n ei nT is the same at x and at
the reported x0: in the latter, the slot x0
1 =2is used to complete jobs x1 and
23x2,w h e r e a st h es l o t sx0
2 = x0
3 =4are devoted to job x3. We check that under
both S+ and S−, the total tax on T decreases from x to x0. Equivalently, the
tax on agent 4 increases. By Deﬁnition 2
under S
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Now any m e c h a n i s md e s c r i b e di ns t a t e m e n ti) of Theorem 2 is vulnerable to
the same trilateral transfer: indeed α(xN) and γ(xN) do not change from x
to x0. Therefore we have proved
Corollary 4 to Theorem 2 If |N| ≥ 4, any eﬃcient and continuous
mechanism is vulnerable to job transfers involving three or more agents.
For the sake of brevity, we do not give a formal deﬁnition of proﬁtable
t r a n s f e r so fj o b si n v o l v i n g3o rm o r ea g e n t s . T h ed e ﬁnition is notationally
cumbersome, and brings no additional intuition beyond that provided by
the numerical example above. Notice that the shift from x to x0 may be
interpreted as the combination of merging jobs x1,x 2 and splitting job x3.
This suggests that our ﬁrst negative result, Theorem 1, is closely related to
Corollary 4.
9C o n c l u d i n g c o m m e n t
The equality of waiting costs accross agents is an important simplifying as-
sumption in our model. When we allow arbitrary linear waiting costs, the two
solutions S+,S−, are easily extended (see Chun [2004b], who oﬀers a charac-
terization based on Consistency). But the interpretation of Merge-proofness
becomes problematic: which waiting cost will the merged coalition adopt ?
By merging with a null agent whose waiting cost is diﬀerent, an agent can
eﬀectively misreport his own cost, hence the S+ mechanism becomes vulner-
able to merging, even if the server has full knowledge of individual waiting
costs. On the other hand splitting maneuvers are unambiguous in this con-
text, provided all aliases have the same waiting cost as the true agent; and
transferring tactics are similarly well deﬁned. It is easy to check that the
extended S+ and S− solutions are still pairwise transfer-proof, and the latter
is split-proof.
Whether or not a characterization result similar to Theorem 2 holds in
this context is left for future research.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Theorem 1
We ﬁx N,|N| ≥ 4 and a mechanism µ satisfying MPF and SPF, as well as
either CONT and ETE, and we derive a contradiction. Recall that MPF
implies eﬃciency.
Step 1 A limited symmetry property
Fix N,|N| ≥ 2, and two agents 1,2 ∈ N.Fix any x ∈ RN such that x1 = x2 =
a>0. We write x−1,x −2 for its projection on N\1 and N\2 respectively, and
deﬁne z1,z2 ∈ RN by z1
2 =0 ,z1
−2 = x−2, and z2
1 =0 ,z2




In the merging of 1 and 2 in z1 to agent 1 in x−2, merge-proofness (4) gives
y12(z
1) ≤ a + xP(1,σ∗) + t
∗
1(x−2)=y1(x−2)
because k({1,2},z1)=1 . In the split of 1 in x−2 to agents 1,2 in z1, split-
proofness implies
27y1(x−2) ≤ a + xP(1,σ∗) +( t∗)12(z
1)=y12(z
1)
because 1 is the only agent with a positive job in S = {1,2}. Thus we get
y12(z1)=y1(x−2). Consider similarly the merging of 1,2 in z1 to agent 2 in
x−1, and the split of 2 in x−1 to agents 1,2 in z1 : we get y12(z1)=y2(x−1).
Exchanging the roles of 1,2 gives the remaining equalities in the claim.
Step 2 T h ec a s eo ft w oa g e n t sp r o b l e m s
Fix a vector (a,b) ∈ R2
+ s.t. 0 <a≤ b, and an arbitrary triple N = {1,2,3}
in N.F r o mS t e p1a p p l i e dt ox =( a,a,b) we get
y1({13},(a,b)) = y2({23},(a,b))
Set yi({i,j},(a,b)) = ui(ij) and yj({i,j},(a,b)) = vj(ij). We have proven
ui(ij)=uk(kj) for i,j,k all distinct. Applying similarly Step 1 to x =
(a,b,b) we get vj(ij)=vk(ik). Eﬃciency implies ui(ij)+vj(ij)=2 a + b,
therefore vj(kj)=vj(ij) and ui(ij)=ui(ik). We can now set ui = ui(ij) and
vi = vi(ji) for all j ∈ N\i. Eﬃciency shows that ui + vj does not depend on
the pair (i,j) in N, therefore ui and vi are both independent of i ∈ N. We
deﬁne a function f(a,b) as follows
yi({i,j},(a,b)) = a + f(a,b); yj({i,j},(a,b)) = a + b − f(a,b)
keeping in mind that the pair (i,j) is arbitrary and a ≤ b.
Step 3
We now compute explicitely the vector of transfers for a three-person problem
N = {1,2,3} and x =( a,b,c) with 0 <a≤ b and a + b ≤ c. This shows in
particular that it does not depend on the choice of a triple in N.
Consider the merging of 2,3 in x to 2 in x∗ =( a,b+c). As the total physical
wait of agents 2,3 i st h es a m eb e f o r ea n da f t e rm e r g i n g ,M P Fi m p l i e s
t23(N,x) ≤ t2({1,2},x
∗)=−f(a,b + c)
When splitting agent 2 in x∗ to 2,3 in x, the physical wait of agent 2 is
similarly constant, thus SPF implies the opposite inequality and we get
t23(x)=−f(a,b + c).
Next consider the merging of 1,2 in x t o1i nx∗ =( a + b,c), and the
symmetrical split of 1 in x∗ to 1,2 in x. Our choice of a,b,c guarantees that
the actual wait of 1,2 is constant in the merging, and that of 1 is constant in
28the split. Therefore t12(x)=f(a + b,c). Because t123 =0the vector t(x) is
now computed explicitely. It is convenient to use instead of f the function g
deﬁned by f(α,β)=g(α,α + β) for all α,β ≥ 0. We have:
t(N,x)=( g(a,d),g(a + b,d) − g(a,d),−g(a + b,d)) (12)
for all a,b,d such that 0 <a≤ b, and 2(a + b) ≤ d.
Next we invoke ETE or CONT at such a triple (a,b,d) where a = b. ETE
implies t1 = t2 + a. On the other hand CONT implies that f is continuous
in both variables, and so is g.F o ras m a l lp o s i t i v eε, the net waiting cost of
agent 1 at (a−ε,a,d) is g(a−ε,d)+a−ε, and it is g(2a+ε,d)−g(a,d)+2a+ε
at (a + ε,a,d). By continuity, t1 = t2 + a follows, namely




The last step of the proof extends the above argument to four agents problems
like x =( a,b,c,d−(a+b+c)) with 0 <a≤ b ≤ c and 2(a+b+c) ≤ d. Looking
to the merging of 3,4 and its reverse split, we deduce t34(x)=−g(a + b,d)
from (12). From the merging of 2,3,4 and the reverse split, we get t234(x)=
−g(a,d), and ﬁnally from the merging of 1,2,3 and its reverse split we have
t123(x)=g(a + b + c,d). Gathering our results
t(x)=( g(a,d),g(a+b,d)−g(a,d),g(a+b+c,d)−g(a+b,d),−g(a+b+c,d))
At a proﬁle x where b = c, ETE or the same continuity argument as above
gives
g(a + b,d) − g(a,d)=g(a +2 b,d) − g(a + b,d)+b (14)
We derive ﬁnally a contradiction between (14) and (13). Taking a = b in
(14), and omitting d for simplicity, we get
g(3a)=2 g(2a) − g(a) − a =3 g(a) − 3a
Taking b =2 a gives similarly g(5a)=5 g(a)−8a. Finally taking a =2 x,b =
3x in (14) again gives
g(8x)=2 g(5x) − g(2x) − 3x =1 0 g(x) − g(2x) − 19x
On the other hand (13) is g(2x)=2 g(x)−x, and implies g(8x)=8 g(x)−12x.
A contradiction follows.
2910.2 Theorem 2
10.2.1 Proof of Statement i
Consider the method associated with the functions α and γ. As a spread or
a shrink leaves the sum xN, and therefore γ(xN), unchanged, we can simply
ignore γ while checking PTP. Recall that y+ and y− are separable with
associated functions θ
+ and θ











For ﬁxed b and z, the function a −→ θ(a,b;z) is linear before b and linear
after b, and its slope drops by 1
2 at b. In particular, this function is concave.
Thus all we need to show is that any mechanism coming from the method y
meets PTP.
Consider ﬁrst S,x,x0 and ε as in the premises of (10). Assume without
loss of generality x1 <x 2 and that agent 2 ∈ S transfers ε of his job to 1 ∈ S.
As xN = x0
N, we omit xN in θ(xi,x j;xN) and compute the total net cost of
























where the term pk = x0
1 ∧ xk + x0
2 ∧ xk − x1 ∧ xk − x2 ∧ xk is nonnegative
because a → a ∧ xk is concave. Therefore v(S,x0) − v(S,x) ≥ ε. The same
concavity argument shows θ(x0
1,x j)+θ(x0
2,x j) ≥ θ(x1,x j)+θ(x2,x j), and
the proof of (10) is complete.
Next we consider a spread, namely S,x,x0 and ε as in the premises of (11)
with x1 ≤ x2 and 1 ∈ S transferring ε of her job to 2 ∈ S. With the same














where the concavity argument shows this time pk ≤ 0 and qj ≤ 0. Check ﬁrst
that for any agent i/ ∈ ∆(σ0;1,2), we have pi =0if i ∈ S\{1,2} and qi =0if
i ∈ N\S. This is clear because the functions a → a∧xi and a → θ(a,xi) are
linear on [0,x i] and on [xi,+∞[. Next we pick i ∈ ∆(σ0;1,2) and suppose
ﬁrst i ∈ S\{1,2}. We have
x
0
1 ≤ xi ≤ x
0
2 =⇒ pi = x
0
1 + xi − x1 ∧ xi − x2 ∧ xi ⇒ pi ≥− xi
Finally consider i ∈ ∆(σ0;1,2) ∩ N\S. If we show qi + xi ≥ 0, the desired
inequality (11) will follow from (15). Recall that on the interval [x0
1,x 0
2], the
function a → θ(a,xi) has 2 linear pieces connecting at xi a n ds u c ht h a tt h e
slope drops by 1
2 at xi. Therefore
qi =( θ(x
0








The inequality qi + xi ≥ 0 follows if xi ≥ x1. If x0




2 , ensuring qi + xi ≥ 0. This concludes the proof of statement i.
10.2.2 Proof of Statement ii
We ﬁx N,a n da ne ﬃcient mechanism µ meeting CONT and PTP.
Step 1
For all nonempty and proper subset S of N,w ew r i t eH(S)={x ∈ RN
+|xi <
xj for i ∈ S,j ∈ N\S}. We prove the existence of a function gS(a,b) such
that
g








S(xS,x N)=tS(x) for all x ∈ H(S)
where t(x) is the monetary transfer selected by µ.
For any x ∈ H(S), eﬃciency of µ implies that σ(x) ranks S ahead of N\S,




|S| if i ∈ S,x∗
i = xi if i ∈ N\S.N o t et h a tx∗ is also in H(x).O u r
ﬁrst step toward proving (16) is to show tS(x)=tS(x∗).
We call two agents i,j adjacent at x if ∆(σ(x);i,j)=∅. Given x and




2(xi + xj),x 0
k = xk otherwise. Thus x0 is a shrink of x, and x
as p r e a do fx0, and PTP implies yS(x)=yS(x0) − ε, where ε = 1
2|xi − xj|.
Note that x0 is in H(S) as well, and that v(S,x0)=v(S,x) − ε, because
]xi,x j[ contains no xk,k 6= i,j.Now yS(x)=v(S,x)+tS(x) and the similar
equality for x0 imply tS(x)=tS(x0).
For any x ∈ H(S) such that x 6= x∗, we can ﬁnd two agents i,j ∈ S, adja-
cent at x,a n da v e r a g exi and xj without changing tS(x). Thus we construct
a sequence x◦ = x,x1,x 2,..., by averaging at each step some pair xi,x j where




p)+tS(x) for p =0 ,1,2,...
By continuity of yS and of v(S,.), we deduce yS(x∗)=v(S,x∗)+tS(x);
because x∗ ∈ H(x),t h i sg i v e stS(x)=tS(x∗) as claimed.
A symmetrical construction, starting from any x ∈ H(S), and succes-
sively averaging xi,x j for some i,j ∈ N\S adjacent at x, delivers tN\S(x)=
tN\S(x∗) where (x∗)i =
xN\S
|N\S| if i ∈ N\S and (x∗)i = xi if i ∈ S. Combining
this with tS(x)=tS(x∗), and tS + tN\S =0 , we see that tS(x) only depends
upon xS and xN\S, and can be written as in (16) for some function gS. Finally




|N| and the proof of Step 1 is complete.
In the next step we use the following consequence of (16). If at problem
(N,x) we have xj <x i <x k for all j ∈ S and all k ∈ NÂS ∪ {i},t h e n
ti(x)=gS∪{i}(xS∪{i},x N) −gS(xS,x N).T h i sh o l d se v e ni fS = ∅, by setting
g∅ =0 ,a n da l s oi fS ∪ {i} = N, by setting gN =0 .
Step 2
We observe ﬁrst that each function gS is continuous on its domain. For
each a,b ≥ 0 such that a
|S| < b
|N| ,w ed e ﬁne x(a,b)=z by zi = a
|S| for i ∈ S,
and zi = b−a
|N\S| for i ∈ N\S. By Step 1
g
S(a,b)=tS(x(a,b)) = yS(x(a,b)) − v(S,x(a,b))
and the claim follows by CONT. Next we apply continuity again at those
proﬁles where two coordinates are equal, and derive a functional equation
32( ( 1 7 )b e l o w )l i n k i n gt h ed i ﬀerent functions gS.
In the rest of the proof we use the simpliﬁed notation S ∪ {i} = S,i,
{i,j} = i,j, etc...
Fix S nonempty, and two agents i,j ∈ N\S. Choose also any three a,b,c
such that 0 ≤ a<b<c .We construct x and, for ε small enough, x(ε) as
follows:
xk = a if k ∈ S;xi = xj = b;xk = c if k ∈ NÂS,i,j
x(ε)=x + ε(ei − ej) where ei is the i − th unit vector in RN.
For ε small enough and positive, any eﬃcient ordering of N ranks S
before j,j before i, and i before the rest. For ε small and negative, the order
is S ≺ i ≺ j ≺ N\S,i,j.F r o mS t e p1 ,w eh a v e
yi(x(ε)) = xS,i,j+ti(x(ε)) = xS,i,j+g
S,i,j(xS,i,j,x N)−g
S,j(xS,j−ε,xN ) for ε>0
yi(x(ε)) = xS,i − ε + g
S,i(xS,i − ε,xN) − g
S(xS,x N) for ε<0
By continuity of yi and of gT, for all T,w ed e d u c e
b + g
S,i,j(sa +2 b,d) − g
S,j(sa + b,d)=g
S,i(sa + b,d) − g
S(sa,d) (17)
where s = |S|,n = |N| and d = sa +2 b +( n − s − 2)c. Our choice of c is
only limited by 0 ≤ a<b<c .T h u s i f S,i,j 6= N equation (17) holds for
all a,b,d such that 0 ≤ a<band d>s a+( n − s)b.I nt h ec a s eS,i,j = N,
(17) holds by our convention gN ≡ 0 a n di nt h a tc a s ew eh a v e0 ≤ a<band
d = sa +2 b.
Finally the continuity argument applies also to the case S = ∅,a =0 .
T h u s( 1 7 )h o l d si nt h i sc a s ea sw e l lf o r0 <b<d(recall our convention
g∅ =0 ).
Step 3













33Equation (17) for S = ∅,a=0 , gives (18) for S = i,j. Apply (17) next to
S = k and a<b ,d>n b .
g
i,j,k(a +2 b,d)=( g
k,i + g
k,j)(a + b,d) − g
k(a,d) − b (19)
Fix d, let a converge to b, and use (18) for S = k,i and S = k,j : we
obtain (18) for S = k,i,j. An easy induction argument, omitted for brevity,
concludes Step 3.
Step 4
We prove that each function gi(a,d) is aﬃne in a, and its slope is independent
of i ∈ N. The assumption |N| ≥ 4 p l a y sak e yr o l ei nt h i ss t e p ,a n di nt h i s
one only.



















for 0 <a<band a+2b
3 < d
n. As the choice of i,j,k in N is arbitrary, the term
gk(a+b



















































where we omit d for simplicity. This is a simple variant of the classic Cauchy
equation (see Aczel [1970]). As g(.,d) is continuous on the interval [0,d[, it
must be aﬃne, namely g(a,d)=λ(d)a+β(d). Back to the functions gi,r e c a l l
that gi(a+b
2 ) − gi(a) is independent of i:t h u s t h e s l o p e λ(d) is the same for
all i and we conclude
34g




Step 5 End of proof
As discussed at the end of Step 2, we can apply (17) to S = NÂi,j,a,b




NÂj)((n − 2)a + b,d) − g
NÂi,j((n − 2)a,d) (21)
Now (18) and (20) give
g
NÂi((n − 2)a + b,d)=( λ(d) −
n − 2
2
) · ((n − 2)a + b)+βNÂi(d),
g
NÂi,j((n − 2)a,d)=( λ(d) −
n − 3
2
)(n − 2)a + βNÂi,j(d)
























− λ)d + γi
where α and γi,i∈ N, depend on d. From the continuity of gi in a,d follows
that of βi and of λ in d, hence of α and γi in d. Moreover γN ≡ 0 by
construction. We compute now, with the help of (18), gi and gS in terms of
α and γi :
g














sd + γS = α
(n − s)
2

























S(x)+( 1− α(xN)) · t
−
S(x)+γS(xN) for all x ∈ H(S)
Recall, for any eﬃcient method, any S and any x ∈ H(S), the equation
yS(x)=v(S,x)+tS(x). We have just proven that the method y associated
with µ, and the method e y = αy+ +( 1−α)y− +γ have e yS(x)=yS(x) for all
S and x ∈ H(S). Now if all coordinates of x are diﬀerent, this forces y(x)=
e y(x). By continuity the equality holds everywhere on RN
+. This concludes the
p r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .
10.3 Corollaries of Theorem 2
10.3.1 Corollary 1
Statement i is obvious as y+,y− treat equals equally. For statement ii,t h e
"if" part is obvious. To prove "only if," consider x = d · ei, where ei is, as












Scale Invariance implies y(x)=dy(ei). Taking the j-th coordinate of this








As j varies in N and γN ≡ 0, this implies ﬁrst α(d)=α(1),t h e nγj(d)=
dγj(1) for all j, as claimed.
10.3.2 Corollary 2
Clearly the component γ(xN) in y(x) plays no role in the properties of merge-
proofness and splitproofness, so we can assume γ ≡ 0 without loss of gener-
ality. Observe that the method α · y+ +( 1− α) · y− behaves essentially like













for all N,i and x. We can then mimick the proof of Proposition 2: any mech-
anism with method α(xN) · y+ +( 1− α(xN)) · y− is mergeproof if and only
if, for any ﬁxed d, the function θ
α(·,·,d) meets the system (6); any such
mechanism is split-proof if and only if θ
α(·,·,d) meets system (7).














=⇒ α ≥ 1
Conversely, θ




2on [0,b] with θ(b)=b
2, therefore θ(0) ≤ 0. On [0,b] we have θ(a1 +
a2)−θ(a2)=θ(a1)−θ(0), and the top inequality in (6) follows. The bottom
o n ei se q u a l l ye a s y .
A consequence of SPF is θ(2b,b,d)+b ≤ 2θ(b,b,d), from the top inequality
in (7). This amounts to θ(2b,b,d) ≤ 0= ⇒ 1
2b −
(1−α)
2 b ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ α ≤
0. Checking that, conversely, θ
α meets (7) whenever α ≤ 0 is routine and
omitted.
10.3.3 Corollary 3
Choose α,γ as in the statement of Theorem 2. When does the corresponding






2xN. Therefore ZCNJ implies 1
2(1−α(d))d+γi(d)=0for all i and
all d ≥ 0. From this, γ ≡ 0 and α(d)=1for all d follow at once.
Suppose next that the method associated with α,γ meets SAB. Apply
this property ﬁrst for x,i such that xi =0 . We get 1
2(1 − α)d + γi ≥ 0.




i (x)+( 1− α)y
−
i (x)=αd +( 1− α)
3 − n
2




(α − 1)d + γi ≥ 0
37Summing up over i yields α(d) ≥ 1. Thus α ≡ 1 and the inequality above
gives γ ≡ 0 as well.
10.3.4 Remark 3
The pessimistic stand alone bound applied to x = dei gives the inequality
opposed to (22) above, hence α(d) ≤ 1 for all d. Mergeproofness, on the
other hand, amounts to α(d) ≥ 1 for all d.
Next apply the unanimity bound to any x,i such that xi =0 . We get
1
2(1−α)d+γi ≤ 0, hence α(d) ≥ 1 by summing over i. Thus the combination
of the bounds yi ≤ xN and yi ≤ n+1
2 xi captures, again, the method S+.
.
.
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